来源：英文联播
U.S。 and China Play Chicken on Trade， and Neither Swerves
SHANGHAI — At the heart of the intensifying trade dispute between the United States and China is a fundamental question： Which country is more willing to endure short-term pain for the long-term gain of playing a leading role in high-tech industries。
上海。美国和中国贸易战日益升级，其核心问题是，哪个国家更愿承受短期痛苦，换来在高技术产业中发挥领导角色的长期收益。
China has embarked on an aggressive and expensive plan to retool its economy for the future as it moves to dominate in robotics， aerospace， artificial intelligence and more。
中国已开始高歌猛击，大展拳脚，准备重新规划其经济未来，在机器人、航空、人工智能等诸多领域占据优势。
President Trump has said China’s approach relies on unfair and predatory practices， and on stolen American technology。 And even as Chinese leaders say they want to avoid a trade war， they are staunchly defending their plans and showing little sign of backing down。
特朗普总统说中国的办法是依赖不公平和掠夺性做法，盗窃美国技术。但即便中国领导人说他们希望避免贸易战争，他们还是坚定捍卫自己的计划，并毫无退让表现。
Mr。 Trump’s threat to sharply escalate the administration’s tariffs on Chinese imports — a threat he reiterated on Friday — shows that neither side has yet gone far enough to persuade the other to compromise。 Bigger and broader tariffs may be necessary to get China’s attention。
特朗普威胁要大幅提升政府对中国进口商品的关税，周五他又重申了这一威胁，这表明双方都没能让对方做出妥协。更多和更大范围的关税对敲打中国可能是必要的。
“The administration， if it’s serious， better be prepared for much more，” said Derek Scissors， resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute。
“美国政府如果来真的，最好准备好继续加码，”美国企业研究所驻所学者德雷克·赛瑟斯说。
China’s$300 billion plan for government assistance， Made in China 2025， calls for helping cutting-edge industries by providing low-interest loans from state-controlled banks， guaranteeing large market shares in China and offering extensive research subsidies。 The goal is to help Chinese firms acquire Western competitors， develop advanced technology and construct immense factories with considerable economies of scale。
中国3000亿美元的政府援助计划《中国制造2025》呼吁通过国有控股银行提供低息贷款、确保在华高市场份额和给予大量研究补贴的方式推动发展尖端产业。目标是帮助中国公司收购西方竞争者、发展先进技术并建立有可观经济规模的大工厂。
It is an agenda that China would probably go to great lengths to protect。 “We will not start a war — however， if someone starts a war， we will definitely fight back，” Gao Feng， the commerce ministry spokesman， said at a news conference in Beijing on Friday。 “No options will be ruled out。”
中国可能会不遗余力地对此加以保护，这是一项议程。“我们不会发起战争，然而，如果有人要打，我们肯定会还击，”商务部发言人高峰周五在发布会上表示。“不排除任何选项。”
For the United States， victory in such a war would be difficult to verify， much less achieve。
对美国而言，这样一场战争的胜利很难证明，更别提实现。
China could say it plans to ease back on government support。 But that could be difficult to quantify because of the country’s opaque political system and the state’s control of information。
中国会说计划收回政府支持，但这很难量化。
China could back off from rules that favor local competitors and require American companies to share technology if they want access to the Chinese market。 For example， foreign automakers face pressure to transfer electric-car technology to their local partners， and foreign technology companies are increasingly required to submit to security reviews。 Foreign businesses have long complained that many of the rules they must follow are unwritten。
在照顾当地竞争者并要求想进入中国市场的美国公司分享技术方面，中国会有所软化。例如，外国汽车生产厂商面临向当地合作伙伴转让电动汽车技术的压力，外国技术公司日益被要求进行安全审查。外国公司一直以来抱怨许多规定都并非黑纸白字。
China’s government-financed campaign is already paying off in some ways。 Drive into downtown Shanghai from Pudong International Airport and you pass a seemingly endless series of huge hangars and vast， glass-walled design centers， all part of the country’s effort tocreate a commercial aircraft manufacturing giantto rival Boeing or Airbus。
中国政府资助的项目在某些方面已产生效果。从浦东国际机场开车进入上海城区，沿路会看到数不清的大型飞机棚和巨大的玻璃墙设计中心，这些都是中国打造商业飞行器制造巨头、与波音和空客一决高下的努力。
Travel to factory districts in Shanghai and on the outskirts of many other Chinese cities and you see enormous， newly built factories ready to churn out electric cars， the batteries they use and other components。
来到上海工业区以及许多中国城市的郊区，你会看到大量新建工厂，准备批量生产电动汽车，电动车电池和其他组件。
Proving that the Chinese government unfairly supports the effort could be difficult， however。
然而，很难证明中国政府给予了不公平支持。
The United States could press its argument with the World Trade Organization， which oversees global trading rules and prohibits big loans from government-controlled banks at artificially low interest rates。 But the W.T.O。 requires many contracts and government documents to prove cases， evidence that can be hard to get in a tightly controlled country like China。
美国可以去世界贸易组织去诉苦，世贸组织监管国际贸易规则，禁止政府控制的银行以人为低息发放大额贷款。可世贸组织要求提供大量合同和政府文件作为证据，这在中国很难拿到。
Even when the W.T.O。 rules against China， persuading the country to comply can be challenging。 One such ruling， involving China’s restrictions on foreign electronic payment systems， was issued nearly six years ago。 China is still mulling how it will comply — despite numerous complaints from the Obama administration and more recent nudges from the Trump administration。
就算世贸组织做出对中国不利的裁决，让中国遵守也颇具挑战。其中一例是大约六年前，中国限制外国电子支付系统入华。中国还在思考如何遵守裁决，尽管奥巴马政府表达了诸多不满，特朗普政府最近也一直在抱怨。
So the United States has turned to tariffs。 That means it is using a 1980s tool to address an industrial policy issue that is already shaping the 21st century。
因此美国想到了征收关税。那意味着要使用上世纪八十年代的工具解决已在塑造21世纪的产业政策问题。
Mr。 Trump’s top trade official， Robert Lighthizer， was a deputy United States trade representative under President Ronald Reagan。 The tariffs that Mr。 Lighthizer threatened against Japan in those days are among the same ones he is wielding now。 But the two periods differ in two big ways。
特朗普的首席贸易官罗伯特·莱特希泽曾是罗纳德·里根手下的美国副贸易代表。当年莱特希泽威胁要对日本征收关税与现在如出一辙。但两个时期有两大不同。
One is that Japan depended on the United States in the ’80s for military protection from the Soviet Union。 China， by contrast， is an increasingly assertive global rival， sending naval vessels to the Baltic Sea and building a naval base in East Africa。
首先，在八十年代，日本仰仗美国提供军事保护，防范苏联。相反，中国正成为日益凌厉的全球竞争者，把军舰派到了波罗的海，还在东非建立了军事基地。
The second major difference between then and now is that the European Union deeply resented the tariffs of the 1980s， and Mr。 Trump’s use of them could make it difficult to persuade European officials to present a united front。 In response to American tariffs， Beijing could simply shift business from American companies like Boeing and Ford to European rivals like Airbus and Daimler。
第二个重要的今昔差别是，欧盟特别厌恶八十年代那种关税战法，特朗普现在要用，就很难劝服欧洲官员和他穿一条裤子。中国对美国征收关税做出回应，可以将波音和福特等美国公司的业务干脆地送给空客和戴姆勒等欧洲竞争者。
Chinese officials dispute the American accusations about their unfair trade practices。 They say Mr。 Trump’s tariffs violate W.T.O。 rules， and they dispute claims that China forces American companies to hand over technology。 As for Made in China 2025， Chinese officials say the plan is only guidance， not a government directive — and that foreign companies are free to participate， too。
中国官员反驳了美国人对不公平贸易做法的指责。他们说特朗普先生征收关税违反世贸组织规则，并反对有关中国强迫美国公司移交技术的说法。对于《中国制造2025》，中国官员说计划不过是一个指导，不是政府指令，外国公司也可以自由参与。
In China’s current industrial policy， the Trump administration sees an extension of how the country has already come to dominate one major industry of the future： solar power。
中国目前的产业政策，特朗普政府发现中国已经在未来的一个重要产业中占据主导：太阳能。
Mr。 Trump himself is no fan of solar panels。 He has spoken enthusiastically about coal， not renewable energy， throughout his campaign and his presidency。 But the solar power industry is one of the biggest success stories so far in China’s efforts involving advanced industries。
特朗普本人不喜欢太阳能板。他在整个大选期间和当总统期间鼓吹煤炭而非可再生能源。但太阳能产业是中国谋求发展先进产业获得的最大成功之一。
The United States played a central role in developing solar panels and manufacturing them until a decade ago。 Around then， the Chinese government decided to finance a lavish expansion of the sector。 State-controlled banks lent tens of billions of dollars at low interest rates despite the high-profile bankruptcies of solar manufacturers。
十年前，美国在开发太阳能电池板和制造方面发挥核心作用。大概当时，中国政府决定资助扩张这一产业。国有控股银行贷出数百亿美元低吸贷款，尽管太阳能制造厂商总会破产。
Chinese firms now produce three-quarters of the world’s solar panels。 Most American and European companies have closed factories， and many have become insolvent。 China’s success in producing solar panels has given Beijing a blueprint for seizing the lead in a long list of other high-tech industries。
中国公司现在生产了全世界四分之三的太阳能板。多数美欧公司的工厂倒闭了，许多资不抵债。中国太阳能制造业的成功可让中国政府作为范本，在各类技术产业获得领导地位。
The states most likely to get hurt in the trade spat are deep red farm states that voted overwhelmingly for President Trump。 They export a lot of soybeans， beef and other commodities to China， and Beijing is now threatening tariffs on them。
最有可能因贸易斗法受害的州是深红色农业州，而这些州曾一边倒投了特朗普总统的票。他们向中国出口大量大豆、牛肉和其他商品，中国政府威胁要对他们加征关税。
Many foreign companies are caught between China’s industrial ambitions and Washington’s efforts to stop them， including major aerospace companies and carmakers。 The conflict may spread： Made in China 2025 could create major competitors to General Electric and Intel， and to companies outside the United States like Siemens and Samsung。
许多外国公司被夹在中国产业雄心和美国政府阻击努力之间，其中包括航空公司和汽车制造厂商。冲突可能会扩散：《中国制造2025》将产生可与通用电气和英特尔竞争的公司，也会成为西门子和三星等非美国公司的竞争者。
Tariffs could hurt such companies if the United States and China follow through on their plans。 They also risk losing their competitiveness if Beijing succeeds in subsidizing the creation of large Chinese rivals in their industries。
如果美国和中国说到做到，关税会伤害这些公司。可如果中国政府成功补贴这些产业中的主要中国对手，他们也冒着失去竞争力的风险。
Boeing， for example， could be hit by American tariffs on civilian aircraft parts it buys from Avic， a state-controlled Chinese military and aviation company — required purchases if the company， which is based in Chicago， wants to sell planes in China。 China， in turn， is pushing a consortium that includes Avic to become a Boeing rival。 Boeing， like other multinational companies， has refrained from endorsing or criticizing the tariffs。
例如，美国对民航零件征收关税会打击波音，因为波音从国有控股的中国军事和航空公司中航工业集团购买零件，这家芝加哥公司如果要在中国买飞机，就要从这家公司购买零件。反过来，中国又推动建立一个联合公司成为波音的对手，中航工业就是其中之一。同其他跨国公司一样，波音对关税既不支持，也不批评。
“Although our members are unhappy with retaliatory tariffs being used，” said Kenneth Jarrett， the president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai， “there is a belief that greater pressure has to be brought to bear on China。”
“尽管我们的成员不喜欢报复性关税，”上海美国商会会长肯尼斯·贾勒特说。“他们相信必须让中国承受更大的压力。”
