来源：继民财经汇
美联储主席最新讲话（全文），道指狂跌……
美国联邦储备委员会主席鲍威尔（JeromePowell）周五重申了他的承诺，即继续经济扩张，同时承认关税和其他因素正在导致经济增长放缓。
鲍威尔虽然没有具体说出他认为利率应该走向何方，但他承诺美联储“将酌情采取行动，以维持扩张”。鲍威尔在美联储杰克逊霍尔（Jackson Hole）研讨会上发表年度演讲时也表示，美联储充分就业和物价稳定的双重任务“经济接近两个目标”。
我们现在面临的挑战是，采取货币政策所能做的事情来维持扩张，使强劲的就业市场的好处扩大到更多仍被抛在后面的人，使通胀集中在2%左右。他在事先准备好的讲话中表示：“虽然货币政策是支持消费者支出、商业投资和公众信心的有力工具，但它无法为国际贸易提供一个固定的规则手册。但是，我们可以尝试查看可能传递的事件，关注贸易发展如何影响前景，并调整政策以促进我们的目标。
他确实表示，美联储正在研究解决自10年前开始扩张以来发生了巨大变化的形势发展问题。
他还概述了美联储面临的挑战，并表示，对于他和他的同僚们来说，“最近没有先例来指导任何针对当前形势的政策反应”。他表示：“我们正在研究我们在平静时期和危机中所使用的货币政策工具，我们正在询问我们是否应该扩大我们的工具包。
从更广泛的层面来看，鲍威尔对美国经济描绘了一幅基本积极的图景，称美国经济在面临挑战的同时“总体表现良好”。“自去年年中以来，全球增长前景一直在恶化。贸易政策的不确定性似乎正在全球经济放缓以及美国制造业和资本支出疲软中发挥作用，”他表示。
在7月30日至31日的会议上，决策联邦公开市场委员会批准了25个基点的降息，这是11年来的首次降息。官员们指出，人们担心全球经济增长放缓、美中贸易紧张以及通胀下降。
市场预计美联储在9月份的会议上将再次批准降息，并在年底前批准再次降息。
在周五的讨论中，鲍威尔将美联储的政策分为三个时代：一个从1950-82年持续，美联储采用“停止和前进”的政策，促进更快的增长，但最终导致通货膨胀失控；1983-2009年，美联储控制了通货膨胀，但出现了金融过度，最终导致了大萧条；和当今时代，政策制定者正面临一个增长放缓的世界，利率和失业率低于正常水平。
“我们没有看到不可持续的借贷、金融繁荣或其他在大调整期间发生的过度行为，我继续判断总体金融稳定风险是温和的。但我们保持警惕，”他说。
“由于货币政策最重要的影响是在一年或更长时间的不确定滞后中感受到的，因此委员会必须尝试研究可能经过的发展，并关注那些似乎随着时间的推移可能影响前景或构成重大事项的事情。这样做的风险，”他补充说。“但是，将贸易政策的不确定性纳入这一框架是一项新的挑战。制定贸易政策是国会和政府的事，而不是美联储的事。”
鲍威尔没有提及一直令市场大为动致的收益率曲线反转，其中2年期美国国债已经超过了10年期国债，这是过去50年来可靠的衰退指标。上次会议的会议记录也只提到曲线分布，鲍威尔在讲话中没有提到经济衰退。
以下是讲话全文
中文翻译仅供参考
August 23， 2019
Challenges for Monetary Policy
Chair Jerome H。 Powell
At the “Challenges for Monetary Policy“ symposium， sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City， Jackson Hole， Wyoming
2019年8月23日
货币政策的挑战
Chair Jerome H。 Powell
在由堪萨斯城联邦储备银行主办的“货币政策的挑战”研讨会上，怀俄明州杰克逊霍尔
This year‘s symposium topic is “Challenges for Monetary Policy，” and for the Federal Reserve those challenges flow from our mandate to foster maximum employment and price stability。 From this perspective， our economy is now in a favorable place， and I will describe how we are working to sustain these conditions in the face of significant risks we have been monitoring。
The current U.S。 expansion has entered its 11th year and is now the longest on record.1 The unemployment rate has fallen steadily throughout the expansion and has been near half-century lows since early 2018。 But that rate alone does not fully capture the benefits of this historically strong job market。 Labor force participation by people in their prime working years has been rising。 While unemployment for minorities generally remains higher than for the workforce as a whole， the rate for African Americans， at 6 percent， is the lowest since the government began tracking it in 1972。 For the past few years， wages have been increasing the most for people at the lower end of the wage scale。 People who live and work in low- and middle-income communities tell us that this job market is the best anyone can recall。 We increasingly hear reports that employers are training workers who lack required skills， adapting jobs to the needs of employees with family responsibilities， and offering second chances to people who need one。
Inflation has been surprisingly stable during the expansion： not falling much when the economy was weak and not rising much as the expansion gained strength。 Inflation ran close to our symmetric 2 percent objective for most of last year but has been running somewhat below 2 percent this year。
Thus， after a decade of progress toward maximum employment and price stability， the economy is close to both goals。 Our challenge now is to do what monetary policy can do to sustain the expansion so that the benefits of the strong jobs market extend to more of those still left behind， and so that inflation is centered firmly around 2 percent。
今年的研讨会主题是“货币政策的挑战”，对于美联储来说，这些挑战来自于我们促进最大就业和价格稳定的任务。从这个角度来看，我们的经济现在处于有利地位，我将描述我们面对我们一直在监测的重大风险，如何努力维持这些状况。
目前美国的扩张已进入第11个年头，也是有记录以来最长的。但单凭这个比率并不能充分体现这个历史上强劲的就业市场的好处。人们在黄金工作年数中的劳动力参与率一直在上升。虽然少数族裔的失业率总体上仍然高于整个劳动力，但非裔美国人的失业率为6%，是自1972年政府开始跟踪失业率以来最低的。过去几年来，工资水平较低的人群的工资增长幅度最大。在低收入和中等收入社区生活和工作的人告诉我们，这个就业市场是任何人都能记得的最好的。我们越来越多地听到这样的报道：雇主正在培训缺乏所需技能的工人，使工作适应有家庭责任的雇员的需要，并为他们提供第二次机会给需要工作的人。
通货膨胀在扩张期间出人意料地稳定：在经济疲软时没有下降多少，而随着扩张力度的增强，通胀上升幅度不大。去年大部分时间，通货膨胀率接近我们2%的对称目标，但今年一直略低于2%。
因此，经过十年在实现最大就业和价格稳定方面的进展，经济已接近这两个目标。我们现在面临的挑战是，采取货币政策所能做的事情来维持扩张，使强劲的就业市场的利益扩大到更多仍然落后的人，使通胀集中在2%左右。
Today I will explore what history tells us about sustaining long， steady expansions。 A good place to start is with the passage of the Employment Act of 1946， which stated that it is the “continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Government 。 。 。 to promote maximum employment， production， and purchasing power。”2 Some version of these goals has been in place ever since。 I will divide the history since World War II into three eras organized around some well-known “Greats。” The first era comprises the postwar years through the Great Inflation。 The second era brought the Great Moderation but ended in the Great Recession。 The third era is still under way， and time will tell what “Greats” may emerge。
Each era presents a key question for the Fed and for society more generally。 The first era raises the question whether a central bank can resist the temptations that led to the Great Inflation。 The second era raises the question whether long expansions supported by better monetary policy inevitably lead to destabilizing financial excesses like those seen in the Great Moderation。 The third era confronts us with the question of how best to promote sustained prosperity in a world of slow global growth， low inflation， and low interest rates。 Near the end of my remarks， I will discuss the current context， and the ways these questions are shaping policy。
今天我将探讨历史告诉我们什么，关于维持长期稳定的扩张。一个良好的开端是通过了1946年的《就业法》，其中规定“联邦政府的持续政策和责任……促进就业、生产和购买力的最大化”。2自那时以来，这些目标已经有了一些版本。我将把二战以来的历史分为三个时期，围绕着一些著名的“伟人”组织起来。第一个时期包括战后的通货膨胀时期。第二个时期带来了大稳健，但在大衰退结束。第三个时代仍在进行中，时间将告诉我们什么是“伟人”可能出现。
每个时代对美联储和整个社会都提出了一个关键问题。第一个时代提出的问题是，央行是否能够抵御导致“大通胀”的诱惑。第二个时代提出了一个问题，那就是在更好的货币政策支持下的长期扩张是否不可避免地会导致像大稳健时期那样的破坏稳定的金融过度。第三个时代让我们面对如何在一个全球经济增长缓慢，低通货膨胀和低利率的世界里促进持续繁荣的问题。在结束发言时，我将讨论当前的背景，以及这些问题如何影响政策。
Era I， 1950–1982： Policy Breeds Macroeconomic Instability and the Great Inflation
The late 1940s were a period of adjustment to a peacetime economy。 As the 1940s turned to the 1950s， the state of knowledge about how best to promote macroeconomic stability was limited。 The 1950s and early 1960s saw the economy oscillating sharply between recession and growth above 6 percent （figure 1， panel A）。 Three expansions and contractions came in quick succession。 With the benefit of hindsight， the lack of stability is generally attributed to “stop and go” stabilization policy， as monetary and fiscal authorities grappled with how best to modulate the use of their blunt but powerful tools.3
Beginning in the mid-1960s， “stop and go” policy gave way to “too much go and not enough stop”—not enough， that is， to quell rising inflation pressures。 Both inflation and inflation expectations ratcheted upward through four expansions until the Fed， under Chairman Paul Volcker， engineered a definitive stop in the early 1980s （figure 1， panel C）。 Each of the expansions in the Great Inflation period ended with monetary policy tightening in response to rising inflation。
Policymakers came out of the Great Inflation era with a clear understanding that it was essential to anchor inflation expectations at some low level。 But many believed that central bankers would find it difficult to ignore the temptation of short-term employment gains at the cost of higher inflation down the road.4
1950年至1982年第一时代：政策孕育宏观经济不稳定和大通货膨胀
1940年代末是适应和平时期经济的一段时期。随着1940年代转向1950年代，关于如何最好地促进宏观经济稳定的知识十分有限。20世纪50年代和60年代初期，经济在衰退和6%以上的增长之间剧烈波动（图1，A）。三次扩张和收缩很快连续出现。在事后看来，缺乏稳定的原因通常是“停停”的稳定政策，货币和财政当局正在考虑如何最好地调整其生硬有力工具的使用；3
从20世纪60年代中期开始，“停就走”的政策让位于“太多而不是足够的止损”——这还不足以平息不断上升的通胀压力。通胀和通胀预期在四次扩张后都有所上升，直到美联储在保罗沃尔克（Paul Volcker）主席的领导下，在20世纪80年代初设计了一个明确的止损（图1，C小组）。在大通货膨胀时期的每一次扩张，都伴随着为应对通胀上升而收紧货币政策。
政策制定者们在经历了“大通胀”（Great Inflation）时代时，清楚地认识到将通胀预期稳定在某个较低水平上是至关重要的。但许多人认为，中央银行家很难忽视短期就业增长的诱惑，代价是以后通货膨胀加剧。4
Era II， 1983 through 2009： the Great Moderation and Great Recession
As the second era began， inflation was falling， and it continued to fall for about a decade （figure 2， panel C）。 In 1993， core inflation， which omits the volatile food and energy components， first fell below 2.5 percent， and has since remained in the narrow range of 0.9 percent to 2.5 percent.5 Greater success on price stability came with greater success on employment。 Expansions in this era were longer and more stable than before （figure 2， panel A）。 The era saw two of the three longest U.S。 expansions up to that point in history.6
Anchored inflation expectations helped make this win-win outcome possible， by giving the Fed latitude to support employment when necessary without destabilizing inflation。 The Fed was cutting， not raising， rates in the months prior to the end of the first two expansions in this era， and the ensuing recessions were mild by historical standards。 And twice during the long expansion of the 1990s， the Federal Open Market Committee （FOMC） eased policy in response to threats to growth。 In 1995， responding to evidence of slowing in the United States and abroad， the FOMC reduced the federal funds rate over a few months。 In 1998， the Russian debt default and the related collapse of the hedge fund Long‑Term Capital Management rocked financial markets that were already fragile from the Asian financial crisis。 Given the risks posed to the U.S。 economy， the FOMC again lowered the federal funds rate over a period of months until events quieted。 The 10-year expansion weathered both events with no discernible inflation cost.7
By the turn of the century， it was beginning to look like financial excesses and global events would pose the main threats to stability in this new era rather than overheating and rising inflation。 The collapse of the tech stock bubble in 2000 and the September 11， 2001， terrorist attacks played key roles in precipitating a slowdown that turned into a recession.8 And the next expansion， as we are all painfully aware， ended with the collapse of a housing bubble and the Global Financial Crisis。 Thus， this second era provided good reason for optimism about the Fed‘s ability to deliver stable inflation， but also raised a question about whether long expansions inevitably lead to destabilizing financial excesses。
1983年至2009年：大温和衰退
随着第二个时代的开始，通货膨胀正在下降，并且持续下降大约十年（图2，面板C）。1993年，剔除波动性较大的食品和能源成分的核心通货膨胀率首次跌破2.5%，此后一直维持在0.9%至2.5%的窄幅区间。这个时代的扩张比以前更长、更稳定（图2，面板A）。这个时代见证了美国历史上三个最长扩张中的两个。
稳定的通胀预期有助于实现这种双赢的结果，它给予美联储在必要时支持就业的自由，而不会破坏通货膨胀。美联储在这个时代前两次扩张结束前的几个月里，正在降息，而不是提高利率，而随后的衰退以历史标准为温和。在20世纪90年代的长期扩张期间，联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）两次放松政策以应对增长的威胁。1995年，针对美国和国外经济放缓的迹象，联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）在几个月内降低了联邦基金利率。1998年，俄罗斯债务违约以及对冲基金长期资本管理公司的相关崩溃震撼了金融市场，金融市场在亚洲金融危机中已经脆弱不堪。鉴于美国经济面临的风险，联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）在几个月内再次下调了联邦基金利率，直到事态平息。10年的扩张经受住了这两个事件，没有明显的通胀成本。
到世纪之交，金融行为开始变得显得过度，全球事件将对新时代的稳定构成主要威胁，而不是过热和不断上升的通胀。2000年科技股泡沫的破灭和2001年9月11日的恐怖袭击在导致经济放缓、经济陷入衰退方面起到了关键作用。全球金融危机。因此，第二个时代为美联储稳定通胀的能力提供了乐观的理由，但也提出了一个问题，即长期扩张是否不可避免地会导致破坏稳定的金融过度行为。
Era III， 2010 and After： Monetary Policy and the Emerging New Normal
The third era began in 2010 as the recovery from the Great Recession was taking hold。 My focus in discussing this era will be on a “new normal” that is becoming apparent in the wake of the crisis。 I will fast-forward past the early years of the expansion and pick up the story in December 2015.9 The unemployment rate had fallen from a peak of 10 percent to 5 percent， roughly equal to the median FOMC participant‘s estimate of the natural rate of unemployment at the time。 At this point， the Committee decided that it was prudent to begin gradually raising the federal funds rate based on the closely monitored premise that the increasingly healthy economy called for more-normal interest rates。 The premise was generally borne out： Growth from the end of 2015 to the end of 2018 averaged 2.5 percent， a bit above the 2.2 percent rate over the previous five years （figure 2， panel A）。 The unemployment rate fell below 4 percent， and inflation moved up and remained close to our 2 percent objective through much of 2018 （figure 2， panels B and C）。
That brings us to 2019。 Before turning to issues occupying center stage at present， I want to address a long-running issue that I discussed here last year： tracking the “stars” that serve as guideposts for monetary policy.10 These include u*， the natural rate of unemployment， and r*， the neutral real rate of interest。 Unlike celestial stars， these stars move unpredictably and cannot be directly observed。 We must judge their locations as best we can based on incoming data and then add an element of risk management to be able to use them as guides。
Since 2012， declining unemployment has had surprisingly little effect on inflation， prompting a steady decline in estimates of u* （figure 3）。11 Standard estimates of r* have declined between 2 and 3 percentage points over the past two decades。 Some argue that the effective decline is even larger.12 Incorporating a lower value of u* into policymaking does not require a significant change in our approach。 The significant fall in r*， however， may demand more fundamental change。 A lower r* combined with low inflation means that interest rates will run， on average， significantly closer to their effective lower bound。
The key question raised by this era， then， is how we can best support maximum employment and price stability in a world with a low neutral interest rate。
第三、2010及以后：货币政策与新兴常态
第三个时代始于2010年，当时从大衰退中复苏正在形成。我讨论这个时代的焦点将是危机后越来越明显的“新常态”。我会快进过去扩张的最初几年，并在2015年12月得到报告。时间。在这一点上，委员会决定，在密切监测的经济要求更正常的利率的基础上，开始逐步提高联邦基金利率是审慎的做法。前提得到了普遍证实：从2015年底到2018年底，平均增长率为2.5%，略高于前五年2.2%的增长率（图2，面板A）。失业率降至4%以下，通货膨胀上升，并在2018年大部分时间内接近2%的目标（图2，B和C面板）。
这让我们来到2019年。在讨论目前占据中心阶段的问题之前，我想谈谈我去年在这里讨论的一个长期问题：追踪作为货币政策指导的“明星”。中性的实际利率。与天星不同，这些恒星移动不可预测，不能直接观测到。我们必须根据传入数据尽可能判断他们的位置，然后添加风险管理元素，以便能够将它们用作指南。
自2012年以来，失业率的下降对通货膨胀的影响出乎意料地很小，促使你的估计稳步下降*（图3）。11 过去 20 年中，r+ 的标准估计值下降了 2 到 3 个百分点。一些人认为，有效的下降甚至更大。然而，r+的显著下降可能要求更根本的改变。较低的 r+ 与低通胀相结合意味着利率平均将明显接近其有效下限。
那么，这个时代提出的关键问题是，在一个中性利率较低的世界中，我们如何能够最好地支持最大的就业和价格稳定。
Current Policy and the Three Key Questions
Let me turn now to the current implications for monetary policy of the questions raised by these three eras。 The first era raised the question of whether the Fed can avoid excessive inflation。 Inflation has averaged less than 2 percent over the past 25 years， and low inflation has been the main concern for the past decade。 Low inflation seems to be the problem of this era， not high inflation。 Nonetheless， in the unlikely event that signs of too-high inflation return， we have proven tools to address such a situation。
The second era‘s question—whether long expansions inevitably breed financial excesses—is a challenging and timely one。 Hyman Minsky long argued that， as an expansion continues and memories of the previous downturn fade， financial risk management deteriorates and risks are increasingly underappreciated.13 This observation has spurred much discussion。 At the end of the day， we cannot prevent people from finding ways to take excessive financial risks。 But we can work to make sure that they bear the costs of their decisions， and that the financial system as a whole continues to function effectively。 Since the crisis， Congress， the Fed， and other regulatory authorities here and around the world have taken substantial steps to achieve these goals。 Banks and other key institutions have significantly more capital and more stable funding than before the crisis。 We comprehensively review financial stability every quarter and release our assessments twice a year to highlight areas of concern and allow oversight of our efforts。 We have not seen unsustainable borrowing， financial booms， or other excesses of the sort that occurred at times during the Great Moderation， and I continue to judge overall financial stability risks to be moderate。 But we remain vigilant。
That leaves the third question of how， in this low r* world， the Fed can best support the economy。 A low neutral interest rate presents both near-term and longer-term challenges。 I will begin with the current context。 Because today‘s setting is both challenging and unique in many ways， it may be useful to lay out some general principles for assessing and implementing appropriate policy and to describe how we have been applying those principles。
现行政策与三个关键问题
现在让我转来谈谈这三个时代所提出的问题对货币政策的影响。第一个时代提出了美联储能否避免过度通胀的问题。过去25年，平均通胀率不到2%，而低通胀是过去十年的主要担忧。低通胀似乎是这个时代的问题，而不是高通胀。然而，在通胀回报过高的迹象不太可能出现的情况下，我们已证明有工具应对这种情况。
第二个时代的问题是，长期扩张是否不可避免地滋生金融过度——是一个富有挑战性和及时性的问题。Hyman Minsky认为，随着扩张的继续和对前一次衰退的记忆逐渐淡去，金融风险管理恶化，风险越来越不被重视。最后，我们不能阻止人们找到承担过度财务风险的方法。但是，我们可以努力确保它们承担其决定的成本，并确保整个金融体系继续有效运作。自危机以来，国会、美联储和世界各地的其他监管机构都采取了实质性措施来实现这些目标。与危机前相比，银行和其他主要机构拥有更多的资本和更稳定的资金。我们每季度全面审查金融稳定情况，每年发布两次评估，以突出关注领域，并监督我们的努力。我们没有看到不可持续的借贷、金融繁荣，或大节期间时常发生的其他过度行为，我继续判断整体金融稳定风险是温和的。但我们保持警惕。
这就留下了第三个问题，即在这个低的世界中，美联储如何能够最好地支持经济。低中性利率带来短期和长期挑战。我将从当前上下文开始。由于今天环境在许多方面既具有挑战性，又独特，因此，制定一些一般原则以评估和执行适当政策，并说明我们如何应用这些原则可能是有益的。
Through the FOMC‘s setting of the federal funds rate target range and our communications about the likely path forward for policy and the economy， we seek to influence broader financial conditions to promote maximum employment and price stability。 In forming judgments about the appropriate stance of policy， the Committee digests a broad range of data and other information to assess the current state of the economy， the most likely outlook for the future， and meaningful risks to that outlook。 Because the most important effects of monetary policy are felt with uncertain lags of a year or more， the Committee must attempt to look through what may be passing developments and focus on things that seem likely to affect the outlook over time or that pose a material risk of doing so。 Risk management enters our decisionmaking because of both the uncertainty about the effects of recent developments and the uncertainty we face regarding structural aspects of the economy， including the natural rate of unemployment and the neutral rate of interest。 It will at times be appropriate for us to tilt policy one way or the other because of prominent risks。 Finally， we have a responsibility to explain what we are doing and why we are doing it so the American people and their elected representatives in Congress can provide oversight and hold us accountable。
We have much experience in addressing typical macroeconomic developments under this framework。 But fitting trade policy uncertainty into this framework is a new challenge。 Setting trade policy is the business of Congress and the Administration， not that of the Fed。 Our assignment is to use monetary policy to foster our statutory goals。 In principle， anything that affects the outlook for employment and inflation could also affect the appropriate stance of monetary policy， and that could include uncertainty about trade policy。 There are， however， no recent precedents to guide any policy response to the current situation。 Moreover， while monetary policy is a powerful tool that works to support consumer spending， business investment， and public confidence， it cannot provide a settled rulebook for international trade。 We can， however， try to look through what may be passing events， focus on how trade developments are affecting the outlook， and adjust policy to promote our objectives。
通过联邦公开市场委员会（FOMC）对联邦基金利率目标范围的设定，以及我们关于政策和经济可能前进道路的沟通，我们寻求影响更广泛的金融条件，以促进最大的就业和价格稳定。在形成对政策适当立场的判断时，委员会消化了广泛的数据和其他信息，以评估当前经济状况、未来最有可能的前景以及这种前景的有意义的风险。由于货币政策最重要的影响是在一年或更长时间的不确定滞后中感受到的，委员会必须设法研究可能经过的发展，并关注那些似乎随着时间的推移可能影响前景或构成重大影响的事情这样做的风险。风险管理进入我们的决策，既有近期发展的影响的不确定性，也是我们在经济结构方面面临的不确定性，包括自然失业率和中性利率。由于风险突出，我们有时应该以这样或那样的方式倾斜政策。最后，我们有责任解释我们在做什么，为什么我们要这样做，以便美国人民及其当选的国会代表能够进行监督，并追究我们的责任。
我们在此框架下处理典型的宏观经济发展方面拥有丰富的经验。但是，将贸易政策的不确定性纳入这一框架是一项新的挑战。制定贸易政策是国会和政府的事，而不是美联储的事。我们的任务是利用货币政策来促进我们的法定目标。原则上，任何影响就业和通货膨胀前景的事情也可能影响货币政策的适当立场，其中可能包括贸易政策的不确定性。然而，最近没有先例来指导对当前局势作出任何政策反应。此外，虽然货币政策是支持消费者支出、商业投资和公众信心的有力工具，但它不能为国际贸易提供一个固定的规则手册。然而，我们可以尝试审视可能传递的事件，关注贸易发展如何影响前景，并调整政策以促进我们的目标。
This approach is illustrated by the way incoming data have shaped the likely path of policy this year。 The outlook for the U.S。 economy since the start of the year has continued to be a favorable one。 Business investment and manufacturing have weakened， but solid job growth and rising wages have been driving robust consumption and supporting moderate growth overall。
As the year has progressed， we have been monitoring three factors that are weighing on this favorable outlook： slowing global growth， trade policy uncertainty， and muted inflation。 The global growth outlook has been deteriorating since the middle of last year。 Trade policy uncertainty seems to be playing a role in the global slowdown and in weak manufacturing and capital spending in the United States。 Inflation fell below our objective at the start of the year。 It appears to be moving back up closer to our symmetric 2 percent objective， but there are concerns about a more prolonged shortfall。
Committee participants have generally reacted to these developments and the risks they pose by shifting down their projections of the appropriate federal funds rate path。 Along with July‘s rate cut， the shifts in the anticipated path of policy have eased financial conditions and help explain why the outlook for inflation and employment remains largely favorable。
Turning to the current context， we are carefully watching developments as we assess their implications for the U.S。 outlook and the path of monetary policy。 The three weeks since our July FOMC meeting have been eventful， beginning with the announcement of new tariffs on imports from China。 We have seen further evidence of a global slowdown， notably in Germany and China。 Geopolitical events have been much in the news， including the growing possibility of a hard Brexit， rising tensions in Hong Kong， and the dissolution of the Italian government。 Financial markets have reacted strongly to this complex， turbulent picture。 Equity markets have been volatile。 Long-term bond rates around the world have moved down sharply to near post-crisis lows。 Meanwhile， the U.S。 economy has continued to perform well overall， driven by consumer spending。 Job creation has slowed from last year‘s pace but is still above overall labor force growth。 Inflation seems to be moving up closer to 2 percent。 Based on our assessment of the implications of these developments， we will act as appropriate to sustain the expansion， with a strong labor market and inflation near its symmetric 2 percent objective。
传入数据塑造了今年政策可能路径的方式就说明了这一点。自今年年初以来，美国经济的前景继续看好。商业投资和制造业有所减弱，但强劲的就业增长和工资上涨一直推动消费强劲增长，支撑整体适度增长。
随着这一年的进展，我们一直在监测三个因素，这些因素正对前景造成压力：全球增长放缓、贸易政策不确定性和通胀放缓。自去年年中以来，全球经济增长前景一直在恶化。贸易政策的不确定性似乎正在全球经济放缓以及美国制造业和资本支出疲软中发挥作用。通货膨胀低于我们年初的目标。它似乎正在回到接近我们的对称2%的目标，但有人担心，长期短缺。
委员会与会者普遍对这些事态发展及其构成的风险作出反应，他们下调了对适当联邦基金利率路径的预测。随着7月份降息，预期政策路径的转变缓解了金融状况，并有助于解释为什么通胀和就业前景仍然基本乐观。
谈到当前形势，我们正在密切关注事态发展，评估其对美国前景和货币政策路径的影响。自我们7月份FOMC会议以来的三周是多事的，从宣布对从中国进口的进口商品征收新关税开始。我们已经看到了全球经济放缓的进一步证据，尤其是在德国和中国。地缘政治事件成为新闻中的一部分，包括英国脱欧的可能性越来越大，香港的紧张局势加剧，以及意大利政府解体。金融市场对这一复杂、动荡的形势反应强烈。股市一直动荡不安。全球长期债券利率已大幅降至接近危机后低点。与此同时，在消费者支出的推动下，美国经济总体表现良好。就业创造速度比去年有所放缓，但仍高于劳动力总体增长。通货膨胀似乎正在接近2%。根据我们对这些发展的影响的评估，我们将酌情采取行动，以维持扩张，劳动力市场强劲，通货膨胀接近其对称的 2% 目标。
The Three Questions in the Longer Run
Looking back over the three eras， monetary policy has evolved to address new challenges as they have arisen。 The inflation targeting regime that emerged after the Great Inflation has led to vastly improved outcomes for employment and price stability around the world。 One result has been much longer expansions， which often brought with them the buildup of financial risk。 This new pattern has led us to understand that assuring financial stability over time requires much greater resilience in our financial system， particularly for our largest， most complex banks。
As we look back over the decade since the end of the financial crisis， we can again see fundamental economic changes that call for a reassessment of our policy framework。 The current era has been characterized by much lower neutral interest rates， disinflationary pressures， and slower growth。 We face heightened risks of lengthy， difficult-to-escape periods in which our policy interest rate is pinned near zero。 To address this new normal， we are conducting a public review of our monetary policy strategy， tools， and communications—the first of its kind for the Federal Reserve。 We are evaluating the pros and cons of strategies that aim to reverse past misses of our inflation objective。 We are examining the monetary policy tools we have used both in calm times and in crisis， and we are asking whether we should expand our toolkit。 In addition， we are looking at how we might improve the communication of our policy framework。
Public engagement， unprecedented in scope for the Fed， is at the heart of this effort。 Through Fed Listens events live-streamed on the internet， we are hearing a diverse range of perspectives not only from academic experts， but also from representatives of consumer， labor， business， community， and other groups。 We have begun a series of FOMC meetings at which we will discuss these questions。 We will continue reporting on our discussions in the FOMC minutes and share our conclusions when we finish the review next year。
I will conclude by saying that we are deeply committed to fulfilling our mandate in this challenging era， and I look forward to the valuable insights that will， I am confident， be shared at this symposium。
长期运行中的三个问题
回顾这三个时代，货币政策已经演变为应对新挑战。大通胀之后出现的通货膨胀目标制，使世界各地的就业和价格稳定结果大为改善。一个结果是扩张时间要长得多，这往往带来金融风险的累积。这种新模式使我们理解，确保金融稳定需要我们的金融体系，特别是对我们最大、最复杂的银行具有更大的弹性。
回顾金融危机结束以来的十年，我们再次可以看到需要重新评估我们政策框架的根本经济变化。当今时代的特点是中性利率低得多，通胀压力加大，增长缓慢。我们面临高风险的风险，即长期难以逃避的利率，而我们的政策利率则被固定在接近于零的水平。为了应对这种新的常态，我们正在对我们的货币政策战略、工具和通信进行公开审查，这是美联储首次进行此类审查。我们正在评估旨在扭转过去通胀目标失误的战略的利弊。我们正在研究我们在平静时期和危机中使用的货币政策工具，我们正在询问我们是否应该扩大我们的工具包。此外，我们正在研究如何改善政策框架的沟通。
公众参与是这一努力的核心，对美联储来说，这种参与的范围是前所未有的。通过美联储倾听事件在互联网上直播，我们不仅从学术专家，而且从消费者、劳工、企业、社区和其他团体的代表那里听到各种各样的观点。我们已经开始了一系列联邦公开市场委员会会议，我们将讨论这些问题。我们将继续在FOMC会议纪要中报告我们的讨论情况，并在明年完成审查时分享我们的结论。
最后，我要说，我们坚定地致力于在这个充满挑战的时代完成我们的任务，我期待着在这次专题讨论会上分享我的宝贵见解。
特朗普本来对美联储主席的讲话充满期待
而美联储主席并没买帐，没有透露明显的降息信号，特朗普怒了、气急败坏地说美联储主席才是美国的头号敌人！
