来源：英文联播
President Donald Trump’s summit with President Vladimir Putin on July 16 will take him to Helsinki， one of Russia’s many lost possessions。 From Finland to Mongolia， the Russian Empire and then， in somewhat different borders， the Soviet Union once ruled more than a sixth of the planet’s surface。
唐纳德·特朗普总统与弗拉基米尔·普京7月16日在赫尔辛基会晤，那里曾是俄国丢失的众多领土之一。从芬兰到蒙古，沙皇俄国和后来的苏联一度统治着这个星球地表超过六分之一的领土，尽管疆域有所不同。
Mr。 Putin has famously described the loss of this empire， which happened nearly overnight in December 1991， as the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century—not least because it has stranded tens of millions of Russian-speakers beyond Russia’s shrunken frontiers。
众所周知，普京先生将1991年12月帝国几乎一夜之间的垮台称为20世纪“最大的地缘政治灾难”，尤其因为苏联解体把数千万说俄语的人隔绝在俄国缩水的边境之外。
The phantom pain over that vanished greatness still haunts Russia’s collective consciousness。 These days， the sting of this perceived historic injustice is redefining Russia’s sense of where its civilization really belongs—and is prompting a revision of how the country views its own past。
对伟大感消失的幻痛仍然萦绕在俄国的集体意识中。现在，这种认为历史不公的痛感正在重新定义俄罗斯对其文明真正归属何处的认知，并促使该国对如何看待自己的过去做出修正。
Less than a decade ago， it seemed self-evident that Russia， despite all of its cultural and political differences， was reclaiming its rightful place as part of the Western world。 In a piece for a German newspaper， Mr。 Putin wrote of a “Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok” that aspires to free trade and shares common values。
不到十年前，俄罗斯重申自己应该在西方世界享有一席之地，这是不言自明的，尽管两者存在文化和政治差异。在一家德国报刊发表的文章中，普京先生写道“从里斯本到海参崴的欧洲”渴望自由贸易和共享价值。
Now Russia is increasingly looking East， toward an uneasy alliance with an illiberal and much more powerful China， and—in recognition of the country’s increasingly Muslim makeup—with nations such as Turkey and Iran。
现在俄罗斯日益向东看，与更加强大的中国以及土耳其和伊朗结成不稳定的联盟，因为俄国也认识到自己国家穆斯林人口构成日益增加。
But even more pronounced is a sentiment that Russia， so unique in its vastness， must remain a world unto itself， a country that should expect kinship from no one—and that， in a motto coined by Czar Alexander III more than a century ago， can count on only two reliable allies： the Army and the Navy。
但更加显著的一种情绪是，幅员辽阔的俄国仍然是自足的世界，从来没想着要和谁攀亲，用一百多年前沙皇亚历山大三世自造的格言说，俄国可以依靠的盟友只有两个：陆军和海军。
Russia is not the only country where nationalism， fueled by a desire to regain past glories， real or imagined， runs high today。 From Brexit Britain to Mr。 Trump’s “America First” policy to Xi Jinping’s emboldened China， the established international order and its institutions—based on cooperation and compromise and built largely by the U.S。 and its allies—are struggling to survive。 The very concept of the West is now in question。
俄罗斯并非唯一奉行民族主义的国家，重拾过去或真实、或构想的光荣，这种潮流如今风头正盛。从英国退欧到特朗普的“美国第一”再到中国的伟大复兴，主要由美国和它的盟国缔造、基于合作和妥协的现有国际秩序及其体制举步维艰，以至于西方这个概念本身都成了问题。
This unraveling has prompted a dramatic change in how Moscow sees its own place in the world。 “Russia followed a Western-centric approach for 200 years， with the West as its reference point， either in a positive way or in a negative way，” said Fyodor Lukyanov， head of Russia’s Council for Foreign and Defense Policy， a body that advises the Kremlin。 “Today this no longer corresponds to the realities of the world—because the West is ceasing to be the center of the world。”
这种瓦解促使莫斯科发生巨大变化，它重新看待自己在世界上的地位。“俄罗斯追随西方中心论两百年，将西方作为参照点，或积极，或消极，”俄国政府智库外交和防务政策委员会主任费奥多·卢科亚诺夫说。“今天这不符合世界的现实了，因为西方不再是世界中心了。”
This change is happening even as Russia’s cities and lifestyle appear increasingly similar to those in the West， something evidenced by the festivities of this summer’s soccer World Cup。 In Moscow， visitors now encounter bike-sharing， vegan cafes and bearded hipsters serving craft beers。
尽管俄国城市和生活方式越来越像西方，今夏世界杯的庆祝活动可为证据，在莫斯科，观光客会看到共享单车、素食咖啡馆和留着胡子的潮人兜售精酿啤酒，但这种变化仍然在发生。
Still， the feeling of a separate destiny—and of being surrounded by foes—has taken hold of Russian society。 Mr。 Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014， and the Western economic sanctions that followed suit， pushing Russia into a recession and a financial crisis， turned out to be a turning point of historic proportions。
命运与众不同且群敌环伺的感觉攫住了俄罗斯社会。普京2014年入侵乌克兰，西方随后施加了经济制裁，从而导致俄国陷入经济衰退和金融危机，这成为历史性的转折点。
“Until 2014， Russia used to see itself as the easternmost bus stop of the Western world，” said Dmitri Trenin， director of the Carnegie Moscow Center。 “Since then， there has been a fundamental shift and Russia has turned inward。 The Russian elite and its leader， Putin， have come to the conclusion that attempting to become part of the West won’t lead to desired results。”
“2014年以前，俄国一直把自己当做西方世界最东端的停靠站，”卡内基莫斯科中心主任德米特里·捷列宁说。“此后出现了根本性转向，俄国向内转。俄国精英及其领导人普京得出结论，想成为西方的一部分，这种努力难以得到想要的结果。”
What’s happening in Russia today isn’t just reversing the liberal legacies of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and Russia’s first president， Boris Yeltsin， Mr。 Trenin added.It’s also an attempt to undo the westernizing approach that has dominated the Russian state going back all the way to Czar Peter the Great， three centuries ago。 To some Russians， the reversal goes even further， with a new appreciation of the Golden Horde， the heir to Genghis Khan’s Mongol empire that ruled Muscovy from the early 13th to the late 15th centuries。
捷列宁说，俄国今天发生的事不仅逆转了苏联领导人米哈伊尔·戈尔巴乔夫和俄国首任总统鲍里斯·叶利钦的自由主义传统，而且试图抹除自三个世纪前彼得大帝以降就统治俄国的西方化路线。对于某些俄国人而言，这种逆转走得更远，他们甚至开始抬高金帐汗国，那是成吉思汗蒙古帝国的后裔国，从13世纪初到15世纪末统治着莫斯科大公国。
Some Russian nationalists now herald this Mongol-Turkic state， governed by descendants of Genghis Khan’s oldest son， as the foundation of Russia’s own eternal empire。 Long expunged from memory， the Horde is trending in Russia again， the subject of movies and a popular TV series。
有些俄国民族主义者现在预示这个蒙古-突厥国的到来，将其视作俄国自己永恒帝国的根基，可那是成吉思汗长子的后代统治的国家。早就被从历史记忆中扫除的金帐汗国正在回魂，成为多部电影和热播电视剧的主题。
There is even a theme park at the site of the Horde’s razed 15th-century capital Sarai Batu—a former film set of faux palaces and mosques where visitors ride camels， practice archery skills and take photos in Mongol dress。
金帐汗国15世纪的首都撒莱拔已被夷平，但这里有一座主题公园，曾有一部电影拍摄时在这里兴建了假宫殿，观光客可以在这里骑骆驼、练射箭并穿蒙古服拍照。
Russia’s official historians and the Orthodox church long viewed the Horde’s rule over Moscow as a barbarian “yoke，” responsible for Russia’s underdevelopment compared with the West； studying its history was banned by the Kremlin in 1944。 。
俄国的官方历史学者和东正教一直将金帐汗国对莫斯科的统治视作蛮族的“枷锁”，要为俄国发展落后于西方负责，1944年，克里姆林宫禁止研究这段历史。
But modern revisionists， inspired by the “Eurasianist” ideology that sets Russia apart from the West， see the Russian state as the heir and beneficiary of that Mongol empire。 They admire its ruthless centralism， its desire for conquest， its ability to maintain law and order—and its religious tolerance， which allowed Christianity and Islam to coexist。
但当代的修正主义者受到“欧亚主义”意识形态鼓舞，欧亚主义将俄国与西方做了区分，他们认为俄国是蒙古帝国的后裔和受益者。他们崇拜残酷的中央集权、蒙古族对征服的渴望以及其维持法治的能力，还有允许基督教和伊斯兰教共存的宗教宽容。
Indeed， the medieval Russian state adopted much of the Golden Horde’s administrative system。 Russian words for money （den’gi）， treasury （kazna） and customs （tamozhnia） are all of Mongol-Turkic origin， and the Mongols’ system ofyampostal relay networks became the backbone of the Russian empire。 But after defeating the Horde’s successors， Russia eliminated most traces of its existence。
的确，中世纪的俄国沿袭了很多金帐汗国的行政体系。俄语中的钱、钱库和海关都来自蒙古-突厥语，蒙古的驿站网络成为俄帝国的支柱。但打败金帐汗国的继承者后，俄国抹除了大多数痕迹。
Once a city larger than Paris or London， Saray Batu today is just a giant field strewn with medieval pottery shards， its mosques and palaces dismantled to provide bricks for the fortifications and churches of Astrakhan’s 16th-century citadel down the Volga river。
撒莱拔都曾经比巴黎和伦敦还大，可今天这里只是一片散落着瓷片的巨大空地、清真寺和宫殿都被拆除用来兴建16世纪伏尔加河下游阿斯特拉罕堡的工事和教堂。
The leading voice of this Eurasianist movement in Russia today is the philosopher Aleksandr Dugin， who combines admiration for the Horde with close connections to the European and American alt-right and neo-fascist movements。
今天，俄国这种欧亚主义运动中最响亮的声音是哲学家亚历山大·杜金，他把对金帐汗国的崇拜和欧美另类右派和新法西斯运动联系起来。
“We， Russians， live under the shadow of Genghis Khan。 He brought us not just the subjugation by the East but freedom from the yoke of the West，” Mr。 Dugin has written。
“我们俄国人，生活在成吉思汗的阴影下，他不仅给我们带来东方镇压，也让我们从西方枷锁中解放出来，”杜金写道。
“Russians before Genghis Khan were just a periphery of Byzantium and Europe。 Russians after Genghis Khan are the core of the Universal Empire， the last Rome， the absolute center of the geopolitical battle for the destiny of the world。”
“成吉思汗以前的俄国不过是拜占庭帝国和欧洲的边缘，成吉思汗以后的俄国是天下帝国的核心、最后的罗马，对世界命运地缘政治之争的绝对中心。”
Mr。 Dugin， despite his frequent media appearances and a reputation of voicing what Russian officials prefer not to say in public， exercises little actual influence in Moscow’s corridors of power， said Andrei Kortunov， director of the Russian International Affairs Council， a state think-tank in Moscow。 Yet， he added， this new fascination with the Golden Horde serves a clear political purpose。
国家智库俄国国际事务委员会主任安德烈·科尔图诺夫说， 杜金先生对莫斯科权力圈子的真正影响很小，尽管他经常接受媒体采访，说一些俄国官员不愿公开说的话。但他说，这种对金帐汗国的新迷恋有着明显的政治目的。
“There is a desire to show the history of Russia not as purely Christian but as Christian-Muslim because we now have around 20 million Muslims in Russia，” Mr。 Kortunov explained。 “And there is a desire to show that the Western orientation is not the only possible trajectory and that there are alternatives to it。”
“有一种动向要表明俄国历史不全是基督教的，而是基督教-穆斯林的，因为俄国现在有2000万穆斯林，”科尔图诺夫解释说。“有一种动向要表明向西看不仅是唯一的走向，还有另外的选择。”
The impulse to abandon Russia’s Western orientation was recently articulated by Vladislav Surkov， a close aide of Mr。 Putin who advised him on the Ukrainian crisis。
普京的亲密助手弗拉迪斯拉夫·苏尔科夫最近表达了要放弃俄国向西看的意思，他是乌克兰危机问题的参谋。
“Russia spent four centuries heading toward the East， and then another four centuries toward the West， without taking root in either place，” Mr。 Surkov wrote in a much-discussed academic article in April。 From now on， Russia—an eternal “half-breed”—will face “a hundred （two hundred？ three hundred？） years of geopolitical solitude。”
“俄国用了四个世纪向东看，又用了四个世纪向西看，但两边都没扎牢，”苏尔科夫4月发表一篇引发热烈讨论的学术文章。他说此后的俄国，永远的“混血”，将面临“100年（200年？300年？）地缘政治的孤独。”
The profound disillusionment also stems from the failure of policies that aimed to bring Russia closer to the West following the Soviet Union’s breakup—a failure that many Western officials now admit wasn’t just Moscow’s。
这种深刻的幻灭感还因为苏联解体后试图走近西方却遭遇了失败，许多西方官员现在承认，这种失败不能全怪莫斯科。
“The West was not sufficiently imaginative or creative in how to embrace Russia back when Russia had the intention of becoming a normal country，” said Lithuania’s former foreign minister Vygaudas Usackas， who served until last year as the European Union’s ambassador to Moscow and now heads the Institute of Europe think-tank。
“西方在如何让俄罗斯回归这一问题上缺乏想象力或创造力，那时俄国有意愿成为一个正常国家，”立陶宛前外长高达斯·乌萨科卡斯说，他一直担任欧盟驻莫斯科大使，去年卸任后成为智库欧洲研究所主任。
“As a result， we are finding a Russia that is searching for its identity between Europe and Asia—and that， in the meantime， has become an assertive and aggressive power with the stamina and the resources to discredit and undermine Western democracies。”
“结果，我们发现俄国在欧洲和亚洲之间寻找身份，同时成为一个自信和激进的大国，有耐力且有实力让西方民主国家蒙羞并遭到破坏。”
While the forces pulling Russia apart from the West have long bubbled under the surface， the breaking point came with Mr。 Putin’s decision in 2014 to invade Ukraine （which many Russian politicians and officials believe shouldn’t be a separate country in the first place） and to annex the Crimean peninsula。
尽管让俄罗斯与西方分道扬镳的力量早就在暗中蓄积，但转折点发生在2014年，普京先生决定侵略乌克兰并吞并克里米亚半岛，而许多俄国政客和官员认为乌克兰一开始就不应该独立。
The Ukrainian crisis of 2014 and the Western reaction to it， Mr。 Surkov wrote， “marks the end of Russia’s epic journey toward the West， a stop to the multiple and fruitless attempts to become a part of Western civilization。”
苏尔科夫写道，2014年乌克兰危机和西方的反应“标志着俄国向西看的史诗性进程的终结，成为西方文明这种多次却无果的努力停止了。”
The Western economic sanctions imposed since 2014 hampered trade， investment and the access of many big Russian companies to capital—as well as the ability of prominent Russian officials and oligarchs to take European vacations。
西方2014年以来施加的经济制裁阻碍了贸易、投资和许多俄罗斯大公司获得资本的机会，也阻碍了俄国高官和寡头去欧洲旅行。
Despite the election of Mr。 Trump and his oft-stated desire for warmer ties with Mr。 Putin， this pain has only intensified。 In part because of congressional pressure， Mr。 Trump’s administration has tightened existing sanctions against Russian companies and individuals。 Unlike President Barack Obama， who feared antagonizing Moscow with such a step， Mr。 Trump has also delivered lethal weapons to Ukraine’s military。
尽管特朗普先生当选后多次表示愿意和普京先生搞好关系，但这种痛苦只是增强了。部分出于国会压力，特朗普政府强化了对俄国公司和俄国个人现有的制裁。同担心与莫斯科为敌的贝拉克·奥巴马总统不同，特朗普先生还向乌克兰军方提供了致命武器。
In Russia itself， hostility to the West has also grown deeper， with TV hosts—while often sympathetic to Mr。 Trump and routinely calling him nash， or “ours”—matter-of-factly discussing the projected impact of Russian nuclear strikes against American cities。 Russian state propaganda often equates Western nations to Hitler’s Germany and promises to defeat them just as the Soviet Union vanquished Germany in 1945。
俄国本身对西方的敌意也日益加深，经常同情特朗普先生、并将他称作“我们的人”的电视主持人们也认真地讨论俄国核打击对美国城市可能造成的影响。俄国宣传部门常把西方国家等同于希特勒的德国，并表示要打败他们，正如苏联在1945年击溃德国那样。
It’s not clear to what extent the Kremlin believes its own propaganda。 While resentment over Russia’s diminished stature is a key motivator of Mr。 Putin’s behavior， so far Russia’s decision-making has been driven largely by opportunism rather than by a grandiose civilizational shift。
克里姆林宫在多大程度上相信这些宣传尚不清楚。怨恨俄国式微是普京先生行为的重要驱动力，可迄今为止俄国的决策主要还是机会主义的，而非大而无当的文明转换。
“I don’t think Putin is thinking in terms of historical mythologies，” said Mr。 Kortunov of the Russian International Affairs Council。 “I don’t think he needs an ideological grounding for his policies。”
“我不认为普京会根据历史神话来思考问题，”俄国国际事务委员会的科尔图诺夫说。“我认为他不需要给政策寻找意识形态基础。”
Still， Russian expansionism is not all about Mr。 Putin and his personal ambitions。 Empire-building is part of the DNA of Russian and Soviet history， said Alina Polyakova， a Russia expert at the Brookings Institution。
另外，俄国扩张主义并非普京先生自己的个人野心。布鲁金斯研究所俄国专家阿丽娜·波尔亚科娃说，缔造帝国是俄国和苏联的历史基因。
Stalin’s Soviet Union， just like Mr。 Putin’s Russia， she pointed out， moved to reconquer lost parts of the Russian Empire once it became sufficiently strong， annexing the Baltic states and invading Finland。
她指出，斯大林的苏联与普京先生的俄国一样，只要足够强大，都会再次征服沙皇俄国失去的领土，吞并巴尔干半岛国家，入侵芬兰。
“Putin’s foreign policy is not really an outlier from a historical perspective，” she said。 “There is a difference between Russia and the other empires， such as the British or the French。 Those empires may have given up even more territory， but in Russia， the sense of loss， the sense of being a victim of the world， has never been healed。”
“从历史角度看，普京的外交政策并非异类，”她说。“俄国同英帝国和法帝国等有一个不同，这些帝国可能已经放弃开疆拓土了，但在俄国，那种失落感从来都未曾平复，他们一直把自己当做世界受害者。”
Mr。 Putin highlighted this perception of victimhood in his March address to the Russian parliament， lamenting once again that， with the breakup of the Soviet Union， the country lost 23.8% of its territory， 48.5% of its population and 41% of its GDP。 Though Russia within its current borders remains the largest nation on earth by landmass， it doesn’t even rank among the world‘s ten largest economies。
普京先生3月对俄国议会讲话时强调了这种受害感，再次哀婉苏联解体导致国家失去了23.8%的领土、48.5%的人口和41%的GDP。尽管俄国现有的大陆疆土仍然世界第一，可它甚至算不上世界十大经济体。
Its GDP is roughly the size of South Korea’s or of the Guandong province of China。 Russia’s political class naturally looks with nostalgia to the time of its youth， when Moscow was the feared and respected capital of one of the world’s only two superpowers。
俄国GDP与韩国相当，或者差不多等于中国广东省。俄国政客自然会怀念自己年少时，当时人人都惧怕莫斯科，那里是世界上两个超级大国之一的首都，受人尊敬。
Today， Russia has no ideology or alternative economic model to export， and its claim to global relevance is backed up almost exclusively by its military might and the willingness to use it， as in Syria， Georgia and Ukraine。
今天，俄国没有什么意识形态或不同的经济模式可供出口，他在国际事务中的主张完全靠其军事实力和不惜动武的意愿来支撑，例如对叙利亚、格鲁吉亚和乌克兰。
“The position of the authorities and of Putin himself is clear： Everything was awesome in the past， during the Russian Empire and even during the Soviet Union， and we want to return to that greatness，” said Russian historian Alexey Malashenko， the director of research at the non-government Dialogue of Civilizations think-tank。
“当局和普京本人的立场很清楚：过去的一切都很厉害，沙皇俄国，甚至苏联时代，我们想要再次伟大，”俄国历史学家、非政府智库“文明对话”研究主任亚力克谢·马拉申科说。
“But what greatness？” he asked。 “There is no such thing as the Russian national idea anymore， just a thought that people should be afraid of us。 It’s a hooligan ideology。 We cannot imagine our future and so we keep distorting our past。”
“可什么是伟大呢？”他问。“俄国国家思想中已经没有这种东西了，只有让人们怕我们这一条。这是流氓思想，我们没法设想自己的未来，所以才不断地歪曲过去。”
And in Russia， he added， rewriting the past to suit present ideological needs is a time-honored tradition。 “Everything is opportunistic。 When I was a student， there was a Tatar-Mongol yoke， then it became a Mongol yoke， then it became just a Golden Horde yoke， and now it turns out there was no yoke at all， and it all was just an interaction between the East and Russia。”
他还说，在俄国，打扮历史，使之适合当今的意识形态需求，这是古老的传统。“一切都是机会主义的，我还是学生时，就说鞑靼-蒙古枷锁，后来变成了蒙古枷锁，后来又成了金帐汗国枷锁，现在又说根本没枷锁，一切都是东方与俄罗斯的交流。”
本文作者系新浪国际旗下“地球日报”自媒体联盟成员，授权稿件，转载需获原作者许可。文章言论不代表新浪观点。
